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RECENT CASE NOTES
that the drawee would pay the checks on presentment, and in default
thereof that it would pay them.6 To say that the cashier's check was pre-
sumed to be given for a valuable consideration can mean only that con-
sideration is unnecessary. In the principal case such a presumption would
be based upon a false fact and it would only be justifiable to make such a
presumption if there were some public policy that demanded a cashier's
check to be an absolute promise to pay under and all conditions.
Many cases support the two views as stated.7 Their object in making a
cashier's check more than an ordinary inland bill of exchange is not with-
out merit but as seen by the facts in the principal case its application
would work a great hardship on innocent parties.
The view that supports the principal case may be stated that notes
are prima facie payment but the presumption upon which the contra cases
are based that the note was given in satisfaction of the debt may be
repelled and controlled by evidence that such was not the intention of
the parties, and this evidence may arise from the general nature of the
transaction, as well as from direct testimony to the fact.8 Such a rule
tends to give effect to the intention of the parties when entering into
the transaction and in the principal case, certainly, it could not be said
that the bank intended to incur direct liability on issuing its cashier's
check, even if the consideration failed nor would the payee in such circum-
stances as in the principal case expect the bank to make such an agreement.
To say that this plaintiff is a holder in due course is a very doubtful
statement.
The cashier's check being a negotiable instrument the defense made
by the defendant in the principal case is established by statute in Indiana.
As between original parties to a negotiable instrument failure of consid-
eration is a valid defense.9
J. D. W.
CORPORTIONS--INSOLVENGY-PROOF OF CLAIMS--X corporation, for a
valuable consideration, assumed all the liabilities of Y corporation. One
of these liabilities was a claim held by appellant for $24,198.62 in the
form of five promissory notes. Neither corporation at any time furnished
any collateral for this indebtedness, or paid any part of same. Receivers
were subsequently appointed for both corporations.
At the time of the insolvency of X corporation, the total amount of
appellant's claim, including interest and attorney's fees, was $33,732.34.
Appellant filed a verified claim with the receiver of X corporation for
this amount.
One S, an officer of Y corporation, had prior to his death created a
trust in favor of appellant in certain insurance policies on his own life.
*Bobrick v. Second Nat. Bank of Hoboken (1916), 162 N. Y. S. 147.
T lron Co. -v. Brown (1874), 63 Me. 139; Munroe v. Bordier (1849), 8 C. B.
862, 137 Engl. Repr. 747; Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co.
(1916), 157 X. Y. S. 959.
$Butts v. Dean (1840), 2 Metc. (Mass.) 76; Duncan v. Kimball (1865), 3
Wall. (U. S.) 37, 18 L. Ed. 50; Briggs v. Holmes (1888), 118 Pa. St. 283, 4 Am. St.
Rep. 597. See Nixon v. Beard (1887), 111 Ind. 137, 12 N. E. 131.
9Sec. 28, Negotiable Instruments Law, 1926 Burns, Sec. 11387.
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After the insolvency of the said corporations, the validity of this trust
was established by judgment and a sum of $28,602.15, which represented
the entire proceeds of said trust, was paid to appellant, and was applied
in reduction of the above claim held by said appellant.
Because of this reduction of the claim by the proceeds of the trust
thus created by S, the receiver (appellee) refused to allow appellant's
claim for the full amount of $33,732.34 as demanded. Held, a creditor is
entitled to prove the full amount of a claim against an insolvent cor-
poration, notwithstanding the claim has been reduced by a third party
after insolvency.'
There are two theories regarding the proving of claims by creditors
who hold securities. One is applied as the "chancery rule," which permits
a creditor to prove his claims in full, without regard to securities which
he holds. The other is the "bankruptcy rule" under which second creditors
are allowed to prove only the balance of their claims above the value of
their securities.2
Indiana has followed the latter rule, as evidenced by the case of
Union Trust Co. v. Fletcher Savings and Trust Co. et al.,3 wherein it
was held that a creditor of an insolvent corporation who has received
a part of his debt by the sale of bonds given to him by said corporation
as collateral securities, is not entitled to prove the full amount of the debt
as a basis for determining his interest in the insolvent estate, but can prove
only that portion remaining unpaid after deducting the proceeds of his
security. It was upon the authority of this case alone that the Appellate
Court decided in favor of the appellee herein.
But the very statement of the "bankruptcy rule," as given above, points
out the distinction between the Union Trust Company case and the one
here in question. The term "secured creditor" has its limitations. It
does not include all creditors who hold collateral regardless of the source
thereof. The federal rule is that to be a "secured creditor" one must
hold as security property of the bankrupt which would otherwise swell
the assets of said bankrupt, or must indirectly hold like property by
having a debt obligation of another who himself holds such property.4
Thus a holder of a note made by one now bankrupt and indorsed by third
parties who put up collateral of their own as security for its payment,
has been held not to be a "secured creditor,"5 and therefore is not required
to deduct the value of such securities, but may prove a claim for the full
amount of the debt.
The same rule has been applied in the case of insolvency of an indorser.
After the appointment of a receiver for an insolvent indorser of a note
held by claimant, sixty percent of the face value of the note was paid by
1Indiana National Bank of Indianapolis v. Danner, Supreme Court of Indiana,
January 28, 1932, 179 N. E. 546, reversing the opinion of the Appellate Court in
170 N. E. 562.
2 See Bank Comy'ro v. Security Trust Co. (1900), 70 N. H. 536, 49 Atl. 113,
115-118, for a. full discussion of these rules. Bankruptcy rule is thus- embodied in
11 U. S. C. A. -See. 93, subd. (h).
8194 Ind. 314, 142 N. E. 811 (1924).
4 11 U. S. C. A. See. 1, clause 23. In re Shatz (1918), 251 Fed. 351.
5In re Pan-American Match Co. (1917), 242 Fed. 995.
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the maker thereof. It was held that the holder of said note was entitled
to prove its claim against the indorser's estate for the full amount, and
to receive dividends until the forty percent balance was paid.6
A similar case exists where a creditor holds as security the promise
of third parties to pay the debt of a corporation in case said corporation
does not pay it. In such situation it has been contended that the creditor
must first exhaust his securities and deduct the proceeds thereof, and
then file a claim against the insolvent corporation for the balance, but
it was held that the creditor could prove his full claim.7 The court therein
expressed the vital point which distinguishes between secured and unsecured
creditors as follows, "In no sense is the promise property of the insolvent
corporation which can inure to the benefit of its general creditors."
The case of McGrat. v. Carnegie Tusnt Co. et al.,8 which the Indiana
Supreme Court aptly cited to support its decision herein, is directly in
point. Therein a bank made a loan of $140,000.00 and took promissory
notes therefor. The loan was made on condition that the proceeds be
paid to a trustee and invested in stock, said stock then to be held as
security by the bank making the loan. In fulfillment of that condition,
the $140,000.00 was paid to a trust company which became insolvent after
having failed to purchase the stock according to its agreement. The
makers of the notes having paid the bank $16,000, it was contended that
the bank would have to make a deduction from its claim of said amount.
The highest court of New York9 held, however, that the bank's share
in the assets of the trust company should be computed on $140,000.00,
the full amount of the trust deposit. It was declared that the contractural
relationship between the bank and the trust company "had no concern
with payments made by strangers."
Applying these rules to the instant case, it is obvious that the proceeds
of insurance on the life of S would in no way increase the assets of the
insolvent corporation or inure to the benefit of its general creditors. The
trust fund created by S in favor of the appellant was in no way a security
furnished by the insolvent. The appellant was not a "secured creditor".
Since the corporation was insolvent, appellant's claim would necessarily
yield a dividend of something less than the amount of the debt. If the
amount paid by a "stranger" is deducted from appellant's claim, the appel-
lant would thereby obviously have its rights diminished as against the
true debtor. Granting, of course, that the appellant can in no event
be permitted to recover more than the actual value of its claim, the
result of the decision seems both logically and practically sound.
P. J. D.
EVEDENCE-INFERENCE UPON INFERENCe-Plaintiff charged defendant
with negligence whereby decedent received a fatal shock of electricity.
Instruction No. 5 was as follows: "hence under the law of this state
an inference cannot be raised from or based upon an inference. You
$Commercial & Savings Bank v. Jenks Lumber Co. (1911), 194 Fed. 739.
1Adams v. Vancouver Nat. Bank, et al. (Wash. 1931), 2 Pac. (2d) 684.
6 221 N. Y. 92, 116 N. E. 787 (1917).
9 Cardozo, T., in McGrath v. Carnegie Trust Co. (1917), 221 N. Y. 92, 116
N. E. 787.
